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IN THE SUPREME COURT
Of the
STATE OF UTAH

TROY MILLER and JOHN U. WEBBER,)
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
)
Vi •

)

ALBERT PACKER and WENDELL
'THOMPSON,
Defendants and Appellants.

)
)
)

No, 965l

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

--·--RELIEF SOUGHT ON

AP~EAL

Respondents seek to answer appellants brief
on appeal and an order of this Court for denial of
such appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondents, as real estate salesman and
broker brought together the appellants and Mr. and
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Mrs. John Wallen in order that the appellants might
build a home for Mr. and Mrs. John Wallen. Which
home was to be constructed upon a lot and built according to the plans and specifications as approved by
Mr. and Mrs. Wallen and the appellants, all for a
price certain. The appellants were to construct the
prefabricated home and the costs for such work, for
the lot, and for all other expenses were to be includedin the price certain, which price had been agreed upon
prior to any work being done by the appellants. The
appellants then commenced work to construct said
home and progress payments were made to appellants
by Mr. and Mrs. John Wallen, which money was disbursed directly to appellants by the First Security
Bank of Brigham City, Utah.
Upon completion of the home Mr. and Mrs. John
Wallen arranged for long -term financing at Home Benefit Savings artd Loan, Salt Lake City, Utah and such
loan was closed by said Home Benefit Savings and Loan
in Salt Lake City. That all papers, costs and disbursements were made by such lending institution, and such
papers were approved and signed by both interested
parties, i.e. appellants and Wallens. Respondent
Webber attended such clos1ng upon request of the lending institution and at the request of no one else and
was not acting in any capacity toward the appellants,
as either a broker or an agent to advise the appellants
as to their rights. Appellants were experienced in
building and had closed many loans personally at financial institutions.
Prior to closing in Salt Lake City the First
Security Bank in Brigham City, Utah had paid out all
2
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Money on the construction loan to either the appellants
or to Briggs Manufacturing Company for purchase of
the package home. The $500.00 check alleged to have
been paid for freight was paid to the Briggs Manufacturing Company to complete payment of the package
(R l5l, L l3 -Zl) and never forwarded to Thomas C.
Dyer, Incorporated, who charged and collected for
freight costs, which costs were to be in the total purchase price between appellants and Wallens.
Demand for $500. 00 as outlined in appellants
statement of fact was made by Briggs Manufacturing
Company for payment upon the package home and not
made by Webber (~ l48, l49).
The counter claim as filed by the appellants was
filed in open court after plaintiff and respondent had
completed their case and after defendants and respondents had completed their Testimony but prior to
cross examination of Defendant's last witness
(R t24, L 26 and R l30, L 28-30).
ARGUMENT

WANT OF JURISDICTION

Upon the face of the record on appeal as filed by
the appellants this court is without jurisdiction to hear
this matter pursuant to Rule 73 (a) URCP.
Appellants filed a motion to amend the judgment
of the district court on the 20th day of December, l96l,
which judgment was entered on the lst day of December,
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1961. Pursuant to Rule 73 (a) URCP the time for filing
an appeal from such final judgment is tolled by the
timely filing of a Motion to Amend Judgment under Rule
52 (b) URCP. However, said Motion to Amend and there.
by toll the running of the time limit for appeal as prescribed in Rule 73 (a) URCP must be within 10 days
after entry of Judgment (Rule 52 (b) URCP). It appearing
on the face of the record that such timely filing was not
within the time limit of one month for appeal of such 'at\~
judgment is not tolled and appellants' appeal cannot be
heard by this court for lack of this court to entertain
the requisit jurisdiction of such an appeal~ (Allen v
Garner 45 U 39, 143 Pac 228; Sorenson v Korsgaard
83 U 177, 27 Pac 439).
The District Court by granting hearing after time
for motion to amend had expired did not thereby revive
the appeal time or toll the running of the time limitation
for appeal, inasmuch as the District Court had thereby
lost its jurisdiction to hear such a motion to amend.
And further, that even if this court should determine that such a motion to amend was timely made and
the time for appeal was thereby tolled the District
Court heard such motion to amend on the 14th day of
February, 1962 at ll:OO A.M. (R 227, L ll-18) and the
Court after hearing of said Motion to Amend took under
advisement such motion, and such motion was denied
on the 19th day of February, 1962, and appellants' notice of appeal wasP~C1e~~PY 21, 1962, not within the one
month required by Rule 73 _(a) URCP. Notice of overruling of motion to start running the limitation--on time
for appeal: (Jones v Evans 38 U 291, U6 Pac 333; J3lyth
&: Fargo Co. v Swenson 15 U 345, 49 Pac 1027; Henderson v Barnes 27 U 348, 75 Pac 759).
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POINT I
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS MOTION TO SEPARATE THE CAUSES OF THE TWO RESPONDENTS FOR TRIAL.
Appellants brief alleges improper joinder of action
under Rule 20 (8) URCP, however, said action which was
filed (L) arose out of the same transaction or occurance,
which transaction was that the agreed upon price was to
cover all costs of building a prefabricated home and for
the ground upon which to Locate such a home (Gerard v
Mercer, D. C. Mont. L945 62 F. Supp. 28). (2) That in
any series of transactions common to one purpose, towit construction of a home over a period of time, that to
separate each transaction would be multiplicitous and require substantially the same proof at each hearing to establish a foundation for an action at Law and when such
duplication is made to appear it is the intent of the rules
of Civil Procedure to do away with such duplication.
(Farni v Tesson L Black (US) 309).
POINT II
THE APPELLANTS BY THEIR OWN TESTIMONY
CLAIM NOT TO HAVE BEEN PARTNERS IN ANY VENTURE TO ERECT THE HOME IN QUESTION, BUT APPELLANTS ALLEGE AS A DEFENSE IN THEIR BRIEF
THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE PARTNERS BECAUSE
THEY WERE TO SHARE IN THE PROFITS.
The record (R L8L, L 9-2 L) indicates at no time that
the respondents were to share in the profits of the appelLants. A real estate commission was to be paid not from

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

profits but upon the appellants making a profit. Respondents were not to share pre-se in a percentage of any
profit.
Even assuming that the respondents were to share in
the profit sucq. sharing is only prima facia evidence of a
partnership and that if such sharing is for the payment
of a debt or otherwise then no such inference can be
~~~ (emphasis added) that the respondents were in any
particular partners and thereby limited to recovery of
profits only or to sue for an accounting as the only means
to obtain relief (48-l-4 (4) (a)).
POINT III
THE COURT DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF
FACT THAT MR. JOHN WALLEN PURCHASED A
HOME UPON A LOT AND THAT THE PURCHASE
PRICE INCLUDED THE HOME AS WELL AS THE
GROUND UPON WHICH IT WAS LOCATED, (FINDING
OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW PARA.l) AND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS, TROY
MILLER, ADVANCED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS THE SUM OF
$l,460.00 OF WHICH ONLY $l, 000.00 HAD BEEN REPAID AND THAT THERE REMAINED AN UNPAID BALANCE OF $460. 00.
The Court as the trier of fact being in the bet~er position to determine such matters as contested facts is
given great latitude in determining such facts and such
determination as made by the trial court shall be upheld
unless such court is in clear and obvious error (53 Am.
Jur. Trial ll44).

6
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However, the court had sufficient information and
testimony upon which such a determination could be
made (R l99, L l0-l6).
The appellants allege that plaintiff and respondent
could not recover for unpaid portion of the purchase price
because of an oral contract to purchase real property
under (25-5-3, UCS, l953), however, such statute or
frauds only requires that to have any sale taken out of
the statute that the party to be charged sign a memorandum or other document stating with sufficient clarity
the identification and description of the subject matter
(25-5-3, UCA, l953, 49 Am Jur. 354) ..
The appellants cannot be allowed to sign a contract
to construct a home upon a lot knowing that the full purchase price of the home agreed upon in such contract
is to include all costs including ground costs (R l37,
L 5-22) and then be allowed to set up the defense of the
statute of Frauds and be allowed to receive an unjust
gain from such defense.
With complete memorandum thus taking this matter
out of the statute of Frauds, any claim for non-payment
of a valid cost, the appeLlant cannot set up a further
defense that the respondents were mere volunteers and
advanced money as a jesture of cooperation knowing
that the lot was to be included in the sale prior to the
time the earnest money in question was executed (R 94,
L l7 -l9) and that any money paid down was considered
to be earnest money on the entire contract and to be applied against the entire contract (R l58, L l3) ..
Further there is no find:tng of any breach of a fiduciary duty or grounds for estoppel on the part of Miller
and this matter being raised the first time an appeal
cannot be considered by the Court.
7
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POINT IV
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WEBBEF
AND MILLER FOR REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Respondents acting as real estate men brought together a willing seller and a capable buyer in orde,r that
the seller Thompson and Packer might sell to the Wallen1
a home. Such buyers and sellers entered into a binding
contract between themselves; such contract provided for
the payment of a real estate commission by the seller
(Ptf Exhibit #Q to the agent who brought such buyer and
seller together (Plf Exhibit #l, Line 4l, 42).
The parties to such contract agreed to the terms
contained in such contract and by the terms of such an
agreement bestowed upon respondents the right to receive a real estate commis s1on; and that the appellants
are now estopped to deny responsibility for such commis·
sion, when the contract having been fully performed by
both parties to such a contract, with the intent that the
respondents should specifically be benefited (Beveridge
v New York Elev R. Co. l9 N. E. 489; Second National
Bank v Grand Lodge F. A.M. 98 U.S. l23 ). In Calder
v Richarson D.C. ll F. Supp 948 it was held "that a
third person may enforce a contract made for his benefit even though the benefit of the parties was the main
purpose of the contract. "
POINT V
Appellants filed counter claim at the admitted conclusion of their direct testimony (R l24, L 26) asking for
special or punative damages for under payment by Home
8
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Benefit Savings and Loan of Salt Lake City on December
16, 1958.
The court in its finding that appellants were not under paid had an opportunity to hear all testimony concerned on such matter which testimony included_ the appellants who admitted
l. That they were builders of some experience who
had closed at least thirty loans within the last ten years
(R 170, L 4-8)
2. That Mr. John Wallen established a construction
loan with the First Security Bank in Brigham City, Utah
for construction of the home and that appellants were
drawing all their money from Mr. Wallen (R 166, L l-2)
3. That at the time of closing the final loan at
Home Benefit Savings and Loan in Salt Lake City that
appellants had relied upon the figures given to them by
the First Security Bank of Brigham City, to-wit:
(Page 166 of Record:
Commencing line 8)
A. Therefore when we arrived at the Home Benefit
we took the figures that was presented that that
what was drawn. So the First Security Bank gave
them to us and they were taking care of the draws
and handing them to us.
Q. The First Security Bank gave you the figures for
the closing?
A. Yes, but we weren't aware that they had previously
,_-'-,awn $1,500. 00. We took Mr. Nelson's word, who
said that this $500. 00 when we closed that day, this
takes care of all the draft of $12, 000. 00 and we figured that we had used it.

9
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Q.

A.

This conversation with Mr. Nelson, was that in the
bank?
Surely.

and further the appellants had information from Mr·.
Leo Nelson of the First Security Bank of Brigham City
that "he (Mr. Nelson) had the $12, 000.00 account, and
he stated many times before we closed out there was
only $500.00 due, which would take care of the account
that was left with Briggs, and he wouldn't allow Wallens
to draw on it, or us, until we had settled with Briggs."
(R 169, L 25 -59)
The appellants further allege that they relied upon
respondent Mr. Webber to protect their i-nterest but
that they went to Home Benefit Savings and Loan without Mr. Webber and that Home Benefit requested Mr.
Webber's attendance. (R 137, L30; R 138, L l-8)
Further the appellants had closed out many loans
and under stood all costs concerned and that all charges
charged against the appellants were charged at their
own approval and with their knowledge. (R 138, L 2730; R l39 Ll-3; R 34, L 22-30; R 35, L 1,2)
The appellants admit that $12,173.81 was paid to the
First Security Bank of Brigham City (R l39 L 29-30;
R 140, L l-2) and that the Bank in Brigham _City prior
to the closing informed them that $12, 000.00 was drawn
there and supplied them the information as to such payment (supra).
Plaintiff Exhibit #7 clearly indicates that the Plaintiffs and respondents herein received nothing upon the
closing of the loan at Home Benefit Savings and Loan
and that there was apparently full disclosure of all facts.

to
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Appellants further appeared to have understood
that the $875.00 or market dis count must be paid by
someone other than the buyer under a V .A. regulation
because they have closed out other loans as the seller
and paid this expense (R l7l, L ll-l4} and that the
Veterans Administration required appellants to assume
such dis count costs before the V. A. would give any
loan to the buyer Wallen (R l7l, L 26-27).
Appellants further testified that they received
additional money from the buyer Wallen which was not
counted in their claim for loss (R l78, L 24-30).
The court further found that respondent Webber
breached a fiduciary duty in not informing the appellants that he received a payment for sale of the prefabricated package to appellants, and that the appellants
purchased said package but that this was the only
breach of any duty (Findings of Fact paragraph 4), and
that there was no breach of any duty at the time of closing and that Mr. Webber was not grossly negligent
nor did he engage in any willful misconduct toward
defendants at the time of closing (Findings of Fact
paragraph 5 }, and that where the court does not find
such gross negligence or willful misconduct there can
be no punative damage (67 ALR 2 952) nor is such a
finding tanamount to a finding of negligence. Such finding must specifically found and proved.. And further
the appellants on appeal cannot allege simple negligence
when such was not pleaded inthe triat court (Huber v
Deep Creek Irrigation Co .. 305 Pac 2d 478 6 Utah 2d l5).
Appellants allege that the respondents had a duty to
protect the respondents during the closing of the trans~
action (Appellants Brief, P. 2l) and that respondents
ll
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had information available to them of such a character
as to advise appellants of mbney spe~t or to be spent
(Appellants Brief P. 2l) when by appellants own testimony they had their own books, figures and information at such closing (R l78, L l0-l8) which information
was not in the hands of the respondents.
There is no showing that the appellants relied upon
the respondents to close this transaction, but that the
matter was being handled by the Home Benefit Savings
and Loan and that the appellants were not persons unfamiliar with closing costs, and further that appellants
were not inept or lacking in business acumen with respect to business affairs as found in the case of Reese
v Harper (329 Pac 2d 4l0, 4l2).
A broker and a real estate salesman are bound to
use and to exercise reasonable care and skill, the same
as is ordinarily possessed and used by others or persons employed in similar undertakings, that is the broker or salesman will exercise his good faith and loyalty
and use such skills as are necessary to accomplish the
object of his employment (8 Am. Jur. Broker, Sec. 85),
which employment objective was testified to by Mr-.
Thompson and Mr. Packer to be that a buyer was to be
provided them for the purchase of the package horne to
be completed by them.
A broker's duty is that of a negotiator and it is not
incumbent for him to direct or to advise as to terms of
a contract or to explain or construe words or terms
used in a contract of sale. (8 Am. Jur. Brokers, Sec.
85).
In the capacity of a broker such broker has no authority to close or to sign any contract in the name of
l2
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the seller of any property unless specifically authorized
to do so clearly and definitely by the terms of the agreement between the broker and seller .. (8 Am. Jur. Broker,
Sec • 6l; l 7 L • R. A. (N • S • } (2l 0} •
It is not incumbent upon a broker to act as legal council for sellers or buyers of property or to discover possible mistakes or errors in closing papers when there is
no actual authority or apparent authority vested in such
broker to close such transaction for the seller. (Northwest Poultry & Dairy Products Co. v A. C. Furry Co.
427 Wash. 2d, 35, l76 Pac. 2d 324). Particularly there
is no duty on a broker to act as legal council to direct
or advise when the sellers have an equal opportunity with
the broker to protect their own interests, in that all information which is at hand and is open equally to all parties, which in this case was the simple fact. (Slaughter
v Gerson 80 U. S. 379, 383} In such cases the doctrine
of Caveat Emptor applies with full force and effect, where
no concealment is attempted and the means of obtaining
information is open to both parties to such transaction.
The seller or buyer must look to the title papers under
which he takes and is charged with all facts that appear
on their face or to knowledge or which anything there appearing would conduct him. He has no right to shut his
eyes or ears to the inlet of information and then say he
has no notice or knowledge.. Constructive notice is the
same in effect as actual notice. (Coal Co~ v Doren l42
U.S. 4l7; Northern Pacific R .. R. Co Zl Wash. 320, 55
Pac. ZlO} There is no testimony that Mr. Thompson
and/or Mr. Packer in any way relied upon Mr. Webber
at the time of closing or the accepting of any money then
due to them.
13
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Appellants further indicated that they did not look
to respondents to satisfy any alleged loss, if such a
loss was sustained, because by their action of filing a
new suit in the Third District Court of Salt Lake COunty
against Mr. John Wallen for the recovery of the same
claim as alleged herein they admit that if any money is
owed to the appellants it is owed by John Wallen and not
by respondents (R 23l, L 28-30; R 232, L l-24).
CONCLUSION
The court is entitled to consider all the evidence
and draw therefrom all reasonable and proper inferences, even though another inference equally reasonable might also be drawn (Main Realty Co. v Blackstone
Valley Gas and Elec. Co. 59 RI 29, l93 A. 879, and
ll2 ALR 744). Testimony uncontradicted by direct evidence does not compel the finding in accordance therewith, (Roberts v Roberts, l68 Cal 307, l42 Pac l080,
and 31 ALR 707) since its credibility may be impeached
by the interest of the witness and the improbability of
his evidence. (53 Am. Ju:r. 7 98) Wherefore the
judgment as rendered by the trial court should be affirmed and the appeal of the appellants be dismissed
both upon the facts and law as presented and upon the
further fact that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear
or determine this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
DALE E. STRATFORD
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondents
llOl First Security Bank Bldg
Ogden, Utah
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